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Abstract Believing that accountability could be a vehicle for change, the California Department of Education (CDE) requires all high school students to pass the
Calfornia High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE) in order to graduate. In doing so,
California joins many others states in mandating a high school exit exam as a
current or future requirement for graduation. In this essay, the authors will argue
that this testing approach to school change is based on myths about the role of
assessment, the information testing can provide and the impact high stakes testing
has on urban schools. Although California is the focus of this analysis, these issues
are salient across the county. Testing as a solution to poor student achievement is
based on faulty assumptions. It is these assumptions this piece seeks to address.
Keywords

High-stakes testing  Standardized tests  Accountability

Like many states across the country, California is struggling to revamp its
educational system. As of 2004, 50% of African American males failed to graduate
from high school (Education Week 2007). Just 22% of fourth graders attained
proficiency on the NAEP reading assessment in 2005 (National Center for
Education Statistics 2006). A full 38% of schools did not make adequate yearly
progress (AYP) during the 2004/2005 school year (Education Week 2006). Faced
with a daunting array of shortcomings, California has been searching for an
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educational cure-all. With the passage of the California High School Exit Exam
(CAHSEE) in 1999, California appeared to anchor its hopes for educational reform
to standardized tests. Believing that accountability could be a vehicle for change,
the California Department of Education (CDE) required all high school students to
pass the CAHSEE in order to graduate. California, along with 22 other states, now
mandates a high school exit exam as a current requirement for graduation. In doing
so, the CDE tied the reinvigoration of schools to a common, if not well examined,
premise: testing can cure all that ails us.
Like many states, California has equated school success and improved student
outcomes with students’ abilities to perform well on tests. High stakes teachingtesting which attaches serious consequences to passing or failing-is not novel. States
including Alaska, Massachusetts and Texas have instituted high school exits exams
which fix graduation to the passing of tests. Despite seemingly benevolent
intentions, high stakes testing does not provide a quick-fix remedy to the issues that
burden US schools. In this article, we argue that a testing approach to school change
is based on misunderstandings about the role of assessment and the information
testing can provide. In particular, we are concerned with the significant negative
impact high stakes tests have on urban schools. Although the CAHSEE serves as a
case study for this analysis, these issues are salient across the educational landscape
as more states join the high stakes testing trend. The CAHSEE’s shortcomings are
not unique. It is these myths and assumptions that this piece seeks to unwind.

The Background
The California legislature passed the California Public School Accountability Act in
1999 as the final prong of standards-based reform. As previous reform measures
already standardized content and curriculum throughout the state, the CAHSEE
became the instrument which ensured these standards were being met. Public school
students take the CAHSEE the spring of their sophomore year. The test contains
both language arts and math sections. Students who fail one or both sections of the
test have up to five additional opportunities to pass. The first sitting of the CAHSEE
was in Spring of 2001 for volunteer freshman. After a brief period of recalibration,
the CAHSEE began to serve as a graduation requirement for the class of 2006.
According to the California Department of Education, the CAHSEE has three
stated goals:
•
•
•

to ensure that pupils who graduate from public high schools have grade
appropriate skills in reading, writing and mathematics
to significantly improve pupil achievement in public high schools
to help identify students who are not developing skills that are essential for life
after high school and to encourage districts to give these students the attention
and resources needed (California Department of Education 2006).

It can be argued that the CAHSEE is based on laudable aims. First, the state
wanted to ensure that a California diploma had value. Several conservative
organizations have critiqued the academic rigor of high schools, including the
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American Diploma Project (2004), The Business Roundtable (1998), and California
Business for Education Excellence (2005). The California Department of Education
itself recognized that local proficiency standards were set below high school level
(California Department of Education 2006). By enacting an exit exam, the state
wished to ‘‘ensure that pupils who graduate from public high schools can
demonstrate grade level competency’’ (California Department of Education 2006,
p. 1). Secondly, the state wanted to improve overall pupil achievement in high
schools. Through the test, the state believed they could monitor that state curriculum
frameworks were actually being reached. Finally, the state voiced equity concerns.
Through the state-wide implementation of the CAHSEE, the CDE attempted to
ensure that all schools were being held to similar expectations, regardless of their
location or demographics.

CAHSEE as Assessment and Accountability
The CAHSEE is a high stakes system of assessment and accountability. While these
terms are often used interchangeably, their meanings are not the same. Well created
assessments allow educators to gauge what students know. Teachers use formal and
informal assessments to collect insights about students’ understandings, to look for
gaps in knowledge, and to better understand the effectiveness of their own teaching.
Assessments can take traditional forms, such as tests and quizzes, or more novel
forms including projects, performances, portfolios, reports, interviews and reflections. Good assessment provides immediate feedback as to potential next steps a
teacher can take.
High stakes tests employ standardized examinations to assess particular sets of
skills and knowledge. Not all standardized examinations are high stakes. When
performance on a standardized examination becomes linked to consequential rewards
and sanctions, it becomes a high stakes test. Successful performance on the CAHSEE
provides high schoolers with a significant reward- a high school diploma. Conversely,
for those who fail to pass, it sanctions them with a life-altering penalty: the denial of a
diploma. This approach, the CDE posits, will make California high school students
accountable for their own learning. In this context, ‘‘accountable’’ can be replaced
with ‘‘responsible’’. Accountability is about making parties responsible for a certain
outcome. Herman (2007) defines accountability as the ‘‘idea that individuals,
organizations and the community not only are responsible for their actions, but must
also answer for their performance to an outside authority that, in turn, may impose a
penalty for failure.’’ (p. 3). Accountability has a vastly different purpose than
assessment. We concur with Fusarelli’s claim that accountability is a political
construction (2001). Heubert and Hauser’s National Research Council study (1999)
cautions that standardized tests are often used as policy instruments, designed for
political ends. Accountability is also inherently a marketplace ideal. It provides a
mechanism for guaranteeing the input (the state or district’s financial investment) is
being used wisely to increase output (students ready to contribute to the workforce)
(Engel 2000). Accountability systems attach ‘‘important administrative decisions
about students, incentives, schools, or districts’’ (Caputo-Pearl et al. 2003), to some
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external measure. In the current climate, accountability systems do not simply address
academic goals. Instead, accountability systems include political, economic, personal
and social goals for its various stakeholders (Laitsch 2006).
The CAHSEE follows a long tradition of the use of standardized assessments in
American society in general and in K-12 education specifically. Formal standardized assessments emanate from behaviorist philosophy which, ‘‘places great
emphasis on what can be measured quantitatively’’ (Gunzenhauser 2003, p. 53).
Behaviorist theories began to dominate American schools in the late 1800s, (Oakes
and Lipton 1999) manifesting themselves in the form of IQ exams.1 Some of the
earliest IQ tests served to filter out mentally ‘‘inferior’’ children from regular classes
using criteria that were clearly subjective (Sacks 1999). Standardized testing
exploded in the 1900s. Exams became employed as sorting mechanisms for a wide
range of populations, from Army recruits to elementary school students. From their
inception, such exams favored the privileged classes. Tests were culturally biased to
favor well-off, White subjects (Sacks 1999) while immigrants, English language
learners and the poor were cast to the bottom of the intellectual hierarchy.
The science behind behaviorism has been challenged on different fronts. First,
the influence of theories of cognition challenged long-held ideas about the nature of
intelligence. Cognitive theorists contended that learning was more than a series of
stimuli and responses. Rather, learning was the active engagement between the
learner and his or her environment. IQ tests specifically can be critiqued based on
their truth claims. The belief that all phenomena can be measured quantitatively,
‘‘no longer inform(s) the work of today’s psychometricians’’ (Gunzenhauser 2003,
p. 53). Furthermore, he writes,
‘‘…philosophers of science, have taken a more probabilistic and fallibilistic view
of knowledge. Psychometricians and other statisticians believe that what we know
scientifically is only known with a certain probability … all knowledge is built on
foundations but is fallible; it is our best approximation of the truth until we are
proven false.’’
According to this line of thinking, any test is simply a measure of student ability and
no one can know for sure what a student’s true ability is. Today’s formal assessmentsincluding the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), Advanced Placement (AP) examinations and high school exit examinations such as the CAHSEE-are descendants of
those first IQ examinations. In considering the limitations of the CAHSEE, it is
important to be mindful of the beliefs and assumptions which accompany these
approaches in order to question their validity and explanatory power for California.

High Stakes Testing as a Change Agent: Unraveling the Myths
Community members are bombarded by the rhetoric of testing. It is sold as a
necessary part of schooling, a tradition that might not be well loved, but one that is
needed nonetheless. Since most adults remember sharpening # 2 pencils and filling
1

There were many other manifestations of behaviorism in classroom, including drill and practice and
positive reinforcement schemes used for discipline purposes.
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in bubbles themselves, pro-testing advocates have an advantage. Few adults will
remember testing as traumatic, so how bad can it be for their kids? The first
assumption relates to this shared experience. The assumption is that testing is a
normal and necessary part of schooling, one that is rather harmless. While the
practice of testing has been a common feature in schools for quite a while, the
ramifications of the testing are a new phenomenon. High stakes consequences,
including withholding monies for low performing schools and denying diplomas,
are a recent development. Previously, if a student performed poorly on a test, the
consequences ended with a low score. The low score did not translate into her
inability to graduate, or in state directed sanctions against her school. Now, scores
have tangible, real consequences for students and schools. They are not the tests of
the past; now they have teeth.
Several other assumptions flood the media and are often sold as commonsense
arguments to the public. They include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Higher standards and rigorous tests will lead to better student learning.
High stakes testing provides a valid measure as to who deserves a high school
diploma.
High-stakes testing will act as a motivator. It will encourage children to work
harder and be more accountable for their learning.
High stakes testing is a fair and neutral tool. As all children are required to learn
the same standards, all children have the same chances of success.

Assumption 1: Higher Standards and Rigorous Tests Will Lead to Better
Student Learning
Higher standards would seem to be a logical precursor to better student
achievement. By focusing the expectations teachers have for students, it would
naturally follow that student outcomes will improve. Unfortunately, this is often not
the case. The limitations are two fold. First, the tests tend to limit the curriculum
that children experience. Thus, unless specific content is tested on the state exams,
chances are the material will not be covered in class. In a study completed by
RAND, researchers found that the curriculum in Texas was curtailed after the
passage of high stakes testing, and content areas not on the test received little
attention (Klein et al. 2000). A second study found similar results of curriculum
narrowing and teaching to the test in New York (Mathison and Freeman 2003).
Recent work by Au (2007) investigated 49 studies on the impact of high stakes
testing on the curriculum. His findings suggest that ‘‘tests have the predominate
effect of narrowing curriculum content to those subjects included in the tests,
resulting in the increased fragmentation of knowledge forms into bits and pieces’’
(p. 264). Examples from abroad are also illustrative. Over the course of three years,
Boaler (2002) studied math classrooms in two different schools in England.2 In one
2

On indicators of SES, racial composition, and mathematics achievement there was no significant
difference between the students at these two working-class schools.
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school, Amber Hill, mathematics instruction centered on preparing students for
standardized tests. In another school, Phoenix Park, mathematics instruction was
more concerned with open-ended learning. At the end of year 10, all students in
England were required to take standardized assessments (the General Certificate of
Secondary Education, GCSE). Phoenix Park teachers devoted very little time to
preparation for this test. Despite such a focus, ‘‘significantly more of the Phoenix
Park students passed the GCSE examination than the Amber Hill students (p. 99).’’
Secondly, there is little evidence to show that higher test scores correlate with
higher achievement in other measures, including SAT scores, NAEP scores, or even
classroom grades. Amrein and Berliner (2003) argue that ‘‘If statewide high-stakes
testing policies actually improve student learning, we should see that improvement
reflected not just in the states’ own test scores but also in independent measures’’
(p. 5). Haney’s (2000) often cited work on the ‘‘Texas Miracle’’ found that gains on
the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) did not translate to other
academic gains. Haney looked at other indicators of student performance such as the
NAEP, the SAT and the Texas Academic Skills Program (TASP). His research
revealed that in the same years that Texas had reported gains on the TAAS, student
performance on these other indicators had either no significant change (as in the
case of the NAEP) or significantly decreased (as with the SAT and the TASP). Such
decreased student performance may be an indication of narrowed teaching goals
where students are exposed solely to information necessary for passing their states’
high-stakes exam.
In an examination of 18 states’ high-stakes outcomes, a study by Amrein and
Berliner (2002b) found that ‘‘Sixty-seven percent of states that use high school
graduation exams posted decreases in ACT performance after high school
graduation exams were implemented… Fifty-six percent of states that use highstakes high school graduation exams posted decreases in SAT performance’’ (p. 48).
Moreover, they also found no consistent improvement in NAEP scores among
schools with high stakes testing. The myth that higher standards coupled with high
stakes testing will lead to better prepared children is not automatic. What we are
perhaps seeing is that students are becoming better test takers. There are few
indications that they are becoming stronger students when we look at other
indicators.

Assumption 2: High Stakes Testing Provides a Valid Measure as to Who
Deserves a High School Diploma
By far, the most pivotal question facing the CAHSEE is whether a high-stakes test is
an appropriate and valid measure of student achievement. An important body of
work challenges the claim that test scores capture real achievement (Hilliard 2000;
Haney 2000; Amrein and Berliner 2002a; Cuban 2001). Linn and Baker (2002)
assert that assessment must provide valid information about students and schools. At
its most basic, validity requires that a test instrument measures what it claims to
measure (Jaeger 1993). Without validity, a test can not be used as a decision-making
tool. In the case of the CAHSEE, one goal of the test was to ensure a high school
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education; hence, a valid test must reflect this goal. At this general level of validity,
the CDE contradicts itself. The test is given in the 10th grade. Therefore, students
can only be tested up to a tenth grade level. At this point, the first adjustment must
be made; the state is actually measuring whether or not a child has a 10th grade
education. Moreover, the math section assesses 6th grade, 7th grade and Algebra 1
standards (often taken in the 8th grade). In this case, the state is ensuring an 8th
grade education. Finally, the pass rates for these tests are particularly low; students
pass with a score of 60% correct in English and 55% correct in math (California
Department of Education 2007). In essence, the CDE is requiring that students can
correctly answer approximately half the test at an eighth or tenth grade level.
Answering approximately half of a test correctly in a traditional classroom setting
would be failing.
Valid usage is an additional concern in assessment validity. Not all tests measure
all things. For example, a norm-referenced achievement test might be valid in
providing information about a student’s content knowledge in reference to her
peers; however, it may not be valid as a factor in retention (Smith and Fey 2000).
Moreover, many organizations which specialize in educational measurement
caution against the use of high-stakes testing as a single form of assessment,
including the American Psychological Association (2001), the American Educational Research Association (2000) and the American Evaluation Association
(2002). These experts in educational measurement have been largely ignored by
governmental stakeholders regarding the responsible use of high-stakes testing.
Here the myth seems almost insurmountable; despite all that is known about the
correct use of high stakes testing, the zeal for separating the deserving from the
undeserving has blinded us. We continue to ignore the fact that one single test can
not possibly measure the complete competence of a 16 year old student. That is,
after all, what high stakes tests are doing. Test now matter more than classroom
grades, more than teacher recommendations or portfolio reviews. Tests trump all.

Assumption 3: High-Stakes Testing Will Act as a Motivator. It Will Encourage
Children to Work Harder and be More Accountable for their Learning
Following a market model of motivation, policymakers believe that rewards and
sanctions will provide the needed catalyst for change. Just as a stock broker is
encouraged to work harder to receive her bonus, children will work harder to
receive their diploma. This is a simplistic explanation, one that forgets we are
working with children who are trying to learn over the long term. Amrein and
Berliner assert that ‘‘the assumption that high-stakes tests motivate students appears
to be seriously flawed. In fact, such tests often decrease student motivation and lead
to high student retention and drop out rates’’ (2003, p. 33). Research by Sheldon and
Biddle (1998) also noted that high-stakes testing often decreased student motivation
and limited intrinsic interest in learning. Students tend to be less intrinsically
motivated when rewards are linked to a task (Amrein and Berliner 2003). Moreover,
this assumption relies on students being motivated by the ‘‘reward’’ provided—a
diploma. This is not always the case. Madaus and Clarke (2001), drawing on
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research from Europe, argue that students who are from marginalized populations
may see a diploma as meaningless if the student sees no personal or professional
benefit in having one.
We can assume that if testing did increase motivation, and students were willing
to work harder than they did before tests were instituted, then more students should
be graduating. After all, this is part of the logic: if students know that the test could
bar them from graduating, they will redouble their efforts to study hard and commit
to learning. In fact, the very opposite is happening. Some research shows that
schools with high stakes testing have higher drop out rates than those without
(Amrein and Berliner 2003). A quantitative analysis of data from 25 states
addressed the relationship between the pressure of high stakes testing and student
achievement (Nichols and Glass 2005). Their research found that high stakes testing
is negatively associated with students going on to 12th grade. Tying rewards to
testing is not an instant cure.

Assumption 4: High Stakes Testing is a Fair and Neutral Tool. As All
Children are Required to Learn the Same Standards, All Children
Have the Same Chances of Success
At the time of writing, the CAHSEE had been used as a graduation requirement for
just two years. However, from the very beginning, we can see the differential results
of the test. Taking Los Angeles county as an example, it becomes clear that students
are passing at very different rates. Data, compiled from the 2007 test sittings, are
shown in Table 1.
Troubling gaps already appear. It is easy to believe that because all students are
covering the same content via state standards, all children have an equal chance of
doing well on the CAHSEE. Nothing could be further from the truth. Today,
California’s urban schools suffer from physical deterioration and inadequate
instructional materials, a lack of qualified teachers, and an unequal distribution of
rigorous academic courses (Harris 2002). For example, a poll of public school
teachers (Harris 2002) found that students in schools with the largest concentrations
of low-income children are 12 times as likely to be taught by unqualified teachers
and almost four times as likely to have serious turnover problems with their staff.
Schools with higher numbers of students of color also tend to receive less funding.
A UCLA report (Rogers et al. 2006) found that schools with greater that 90%

Table 1 Scores from the CAHSEE 2007, combined school year tally, 10th graders
Asian pass
rate (%)

Caucasian
pass rate

Hispanic/Latino
pass rate

African American
pass rate

Total
pass rate

Math

95

88

63

54

70

English

89

90

66

65

73

All figures taken from online Dataquest sources (2007)
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students of color spent $6,634 per pupil, while schools with less than 49% students
of color spent $7,268 per pupil. The authors argue that while all California schools
are impacted by educational challenges, ‘‘all communities don’t suffer equally.
Schools with high concentrations of students of color, many who are poor and
learning the English language, report the highest rates of unqualified teachers and
shortages of college preparatory courses in the state’’ (p. 1). Only 30% of schools
with the highest student of color enrollments offer sufficient college preparatory
courses (Oakes et al. 2006).3 These are the courses that must be passed in order for
students to apply to University of California and California State universities. Such
inadequacies do matter.
Having uniform state standards is not the great equalizer. Without the total
package of inputs being equal, including qualified teachers, updated curriculum
materials, and safe and adequate facilities, measuring outputs only will continue to
put children of color at a deficit. While we are judging all children by the same
yardstick, schools are not providing all children with the same tools. For example
while Lisa, a student from affluent Pacific Palisades, and Maribel, a student from
center-city Lynwood, will both take the CAHSEE, they will approach it with
unequal schooling histories. Lisa is in an honors track, has access to updated books,
credentialed teachers and small classes. Maribel, although academically talented, is
unable to be in honors courses because her year round school does not offer one
when she is on track. There are 40 students in most of her classes, 50% of her
teachers are not credentialed and there are not enough textbooks for each student. Is
it fair to hold students to the same outcomes, when they are not treated to the same
inputs?
Due to the newness of the test as a graduation requirement, it is impossible to
determine long term consequences of this policy. However, using analogous
examples from other large school districts using high-stakes exit exams we can see
what California’s future may hold.
Low pass rates on high stakes tests plague urban schools. Haney’s work in Texas
(2000) shows that exams such as the TAAS continue to have an adverse impact on
students of color. His study shows an increase in the drop out rate and retention rate
for African American and Latino students as a result of the TAAS. A study of
immediate outcomes (retention, drop out rates) of high-stakes testing in New York,
Minnesota and Texas found racial disparities in all three states (Natriello and Pallas
2001). In Texas, researchers found approximately 25% of African Americans and
Latino students are kept back in the ninth grade, so as not to take the TAAS (and
possibly fail) in the tenth grade (Amrein and Berliner 2003).
Initial results in California mirror these trends. Rogers et al. (2005) collected data
from the 2005 testing which shows that while 12% of students overall did not pass
the CAHSEE English portion, 35% of English language learners did not pass. Their
report also found that ‘‘schools where there are large numbers of students who have
not passed the CAHSEE are also schools with fewer qualified teachers,
overcrowding and multi-track schedules that limit learning time’’ (p. 1). Schools
with low pass rates on the CAHSEE are three times more likely to be overcrowded,
3

These are schools with 90–100% African American and Latino student enrollment.
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four times more likely to have shortages of qualified teachers and two times more
likely to have at least 50% of math classes taught by instructors who are not
credentialed in math (Rogers et al. 2005). Such tests continue to punish children
from the poorest of communities because they fail to learn in inferior schools
(Orfield 2000). This is where the fair and neutral myth disintegrates. Poor schools
are not getting a fair shake at keeping up with the high stakes game. They are
starting with inferior and inadequate inputs, and then are chastised when their
outputs do not seem to measure up.

Conclusions
‘‘As someone who has spent his entire career doing research, writing and thinking
about educational testing and assessment issues, I would like to conclude by
summarizing a compelling case showing the major uses of tests for student and
school accountability during the past 50 years have improved education and student
learning in drastic ways. Unfortunately, that is not my conclusion’’
(Linn 2000, p. 14)
While respected scholars in the field of educational measurement and major
associations which specialize in educational research caution the use of high stakes
testing, how is it that policymakers still do not flinch? Our myths about merit,
ranking and sorting run deep. Assumptions about the use and consequences of
testing, coupled with desires for a silver bullet, have led schools to a flawed policy
response.
When considering school reform, the baseline question guiding decision-making
should be, ‘‘Does this policy improve student achievement for all children?’’ To
revisit, the original goals of the CAHSEE were to:
1.
2.
3.

To ensure that a California diploma is grade appropriate
To increase student achievement
To close the achievement gap

Across all three goals, there is scant evidence that would suggest we are or could
reach these goals through the use of a high-stakes exit exam. The very construct of
the test does not require students to have a 12th grade education. When analogies
are drawn to other urban districts, including New York and Texas, we see that there
is little in the way of academic gains that transfer to other measurement instruments.
California’s own state data already shows a racial gap in student performance. Other
states’ data warns us of potential increases in drop out rates, retentions and a
narrowing of the curriculum. The very gaps that this response sought to close are
beginning to be realized.
By responding with a test as a way to improve public education, the CDE is
relying on standardization to foment change in education. This system is predicated
on the belief that if all inputs are similar (a standard curriculum), then the outcomes
should also be similar (higher performance on tests). Testing and standards also
follow market ideology in their belief of ‘‘best practices’’—the notion that there is
one best way to get a task done (Oakes and Lipton 2002). Thus, rather than design
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curriculum to meet the needs of diverse students and communities, one fixed set of
standards is applied to all students, with one fixed test to ensure these goals are
reached. However, applying such models to educational contexts is deeply flawed.
Reducing educational equity to an input/output dichotomy undercuts the complexity
of the issue. The playing field will not be leveled through a quick fix approach that
treats equity as if it is a one dimensional issue.
The CAHSEE also raises hard questions about the role of equity, efficiency and
excellence in education. Stout et al. (1994) explains that the value of equity is in
contest with values of excellence and efficiency. These values seem to be mutually
exclusive in the present educational climate. High-stakes tests are an easy way to
assess large numbers of children. Achieving equity however, is not easy. Allowing
tests to serve as a proxy for true educational changes, without providing the
appropriate funding, materials and resources, especially for children of color and
poor children, ensures that equity will never be reached (Hilliard 1998).
Myths about assessments and accountability cloud our collective vision. The
public has been sold accountability schemes as just another form of assessment. But
they are not. Assessment is the stuff of teachers. It is what educators do everyday, in
small and painless ways, to figure our where their students are and where they want
them to be. It guides and shapes the teaching of particular students, at a particular
time.
Accountability is the stuff of politicians. It is about sorting, rating and placing
blame. Its influence on teaching these students at this time is purely detrimental,
hindering teachers, constraining the curriculum and pushing out those whom most
need to be included. Important questions remain. To what extent is the CAHSEE a
response to political pressure or needs? To what extent are these accountability
schemes truly about universal student achievement? The silver bullet of accountability has missed its mark. Rather than eliminating that which gets in the way of
urban learners, it inflicts further wounds on an already injured system.
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